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ABS TRACT
This paper investigates the long- and short-runneutrality of open-
market monetary policy in a world of fixed exchange rates andimperfect
substitutability between bonds denominated in different currencies.
Using an illustrative portfolio-balance model, it shows that when the
public discounts the future tax liabilities associated with the national
debt and the central banksupportsthe exchange rate by trading non-
interest—bearing foreign assets, open-market policy has a short-runeffect,
but no long—run effect, on the domestic price level and interestrate.
When the foreign-exchange intervention assets earn interest that is
rebated to and capitalized by the public, open-marketpolicy loses even its
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This paper exauhines the efficacy of open—market monetary policy in
a world of fixed exchange rates and imperfect substitutability between
bonds denominated in different currencies. While portfolio balance
models postulating limited international asset substitutability have
received considerable attention in the literature,' it is not generally
recognized that their predictions about both the short- and long-run
effects of central—bank operations in domestic debt rest on a crucial
pair of assumptions. These concern the degree to which the public
capiLalizesthestream of tax liabilities associatedwith the qoVernThntT
OebL,and Lhedegree to which it capitalizes the stream of interest eirn—
incJs associatedwiththe central bank's foreign exchanqe reserves.
To demonstrate the importance of these assumptions, we arque,
using a standard open—economy model, that the following two propositions
are valid even in a setting of imperfect asset substitutability:(i) When
thedomestic public fully anticipates and discounts the future tax lia-
bilities connected with the government debt and the central bank supports
the exchange rate through operations in non—interest—bearing foreign assets,
open—market operations have a short—run effect on the domestic price level,
interest rate, and current account, but no long—run effect. The cumulative
current—account imbalance gives a long—run change in tangible or marketable
The papers of Hoyer (1975, 1979) ,Branson(1976) ,Doribusch(1977)
Girton and 1-lenderson (1976), and Kouri and Porter (1974) emphasize the
short-run efficacy of open-market policy when home and foreign bonds are
imperfect substitutes, while those of Henderson (1977) snci Obstfeld (1980)
draw attention to the possible long-run non-neutriiitv ormotEy.
2to'kman ( 1979) has also addre:::ed these qucLioin;,derivingthere:u It,: ci section4. below, in a manner different from ours. He employs a stochastic2
wealth just equal to the change in the capitalized value offuture tax lia-
bilities to the government, so that total wealth, inclusiveof non-marketable
liabilities, returns asymptotically to its initial level.(ii) When, in ad-
dition, the central bank's foreign—exchange intervention assets earninterest
that is distributed to and capitalized by the domestic public, open-market
policy has no effect even in the short run. An open-market purchaseof dom-
estic bonds, say, is offset completely and instntaneously by atransfer of
foreign bonds from the central bank to the public, just asit would be
in the world of perfect capital mobility studied by Mundell (1963).
The argument that government bonds need not represent net wealth
goes back, of course, to Ricardo, and has beenformalized recently by
Earro (1974). Mundell (1960) has emphasized that themacroeconomic effects
of open-market operations depend on the public's ability to capitalize or
internalize the concomitant change in the government's future revenue
requirements. This paper extends these considerations tothe open economy,
illustrating their relevance for the capital-account offset to monetarypolicy
ard stressing the important role of central-bank wealth.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents abrief
description of the basic illustrative model. Section 3discusses the
effects of an open—market purchase of domesticdebt when government bonds
are not net wealth and thecentral bank's medium of intervention
earns no interest. Section 4 showshow monetary policy can lose its
short-run potency when the central bank interveneswith interestearfling
foreign assets. Section 5 presents someconcluding remarks.
model in which agents maximize utility over a tbree-periO lifetime. FrehkeL
and Rodriguez(1975)touchon capitalization issues in a setting of perfect
asset substitutability. The issues, of course, are those raised by1etzler's
(i5l) celebrated discussion of financial policies in closed economies.3
2. An illustrative model
We illustrate the importance of capitalization effects in the open
economy with an aggregative, dynamic, fixed—exchange—ratemodel.3 The
real output of the economy, y, is constant, and domestically-produced goods
are imperfect substitutes in consumption for goods producedabroad. The money
price of foreign output is a fixed parameter from the standpointof the
home country, and is taken to equal 1. All goods are perishable, but
domestic residents may hold wealth in the form of three financial assets.
The first two are domestic— and foreign—currency bonds, which are imperfect
substitutes in portfolios and need not offer the same rate of return in
4
equilibrium.The third is domestic money, consisting entirely of central-
bank liabilities backed by domestic government bonds and foreign assets.
To simplify our discussion of the consolidated budget constraintof the
government and monetary authority, we assume that the governmentdoes not
pay interest on domestic securities in thecentral-bank portfolio. The
central bank's foreign assets may earn interest, however.
The model is described by the following equations:
L(r,r*,Py/W)W =M, L1,L2 <0,L >0, (1)
B(r,r*,Py/W)W=B*, B1,B3 <0,B2 >0, (2)
H(r,r*,Py/W)W+F(r)=D, H11F' >0,H,H3 <0, (3)
MC+R, (4)
c(P)E( d, r —i) + X(P)=y, c',X',E2 <0,1 >> 0,(5)
=y-T+ (rH(.. .)W +r*B*)/P, (6)
A more detailed exposition will be found in Obstfeld (1980).
4
Imperfectsubstitutability is assumed to arise from devaluation risk,
political risk, or both.4






L =shareof money in domestic private wealth
r =nominalinterest rate on domestic bonds
r* =foreign-bondinterest rate, taken to be fixed
P =moneyprice of domestic goods
W =domesticnominal wealth, assumed positive
M =nominalstock of high-powered money
B =shareof foreign bonds in domestic privatewealth
B* =privatedomestic holdings of foreign bonds, measuredin domestic
currency units
H =shareof home bonds in domestic private wealth
F =foreigndemand for bonds denominated in domestic currency
D =stockof government bonds held by thenon_central-bank public
C =stockof government bonds held by the centralbank
R =foreignexchange reserves of the central bank,measured in domestic
currency units
=shareof domestic expenditure falling ondomestic goods
E =aggregatedomestic expenditure, expressed in termsof domestic goods
=disposableincome, expressed in terms ofdomestic goods
=expectedrate of domestic price inflation
x =foreigndemand for domestic goods
T =grosslump—sum taxes, expressedin tes of home goods5
=netjnterest inflow, measured in home goods
=fractionof central—bank foreign assets held in interest—bearing
farm.
Both types of bond carry a fixed nominal face value.
Equations (1) and (2) stipulate that the domestic public willingly
holds the stocks of money and domestically-owned foreign assets, while
equation (3) is the equilibrium condition for the home bond market.5Equation
(4) asserts that central-bank liabilities equal central-bank assets, and
describes the division of the asset side of the bank's balance sheet between
domestic credit and foreign reserves. Equation (5) ensures that the domestic
goods market clears; we assume that demand for domestic output is positively
related to home disposable income and negatively related to the home real
interest rate and price level. 6The service account, decribed by (7), en-
compasses both private and official interest earnings,and equation (8) links
the rate of increase of domestic marketable wealth to the current-account
surplus, on the assumption that there is no government borrowingand rio
investment. Finally, (9) gives the consolidated public-sector budget constraint
when there is no government spending. Since the government does not borrow, taxes
must be levied to finance any interest payments on the public debt not covered
by interest earnings on foreign—exchange reserves. Using (3) and (9) ,disposable
income yd may be written as the sum of output and the real service account,
dy =y+a(r,P,W).
It is worth noting that the functions B, H, and F are net demand functions,
and may assume negative values. Thus, B <0means domestic residents are net
borrowers in foreign currency.
6The expenditure function could be made more general by allowing wealth to
influence spending, and by altering the definition of disposable income to include
expected realcapital losses on wealth due to price-level inflation.Neither
extension would affect the paper's conclusions.6
n important
clarification is in orderat this point.The wealth
variable wappearingin thenodelis
interprete& for themoment, as
tangible wealth,
defined by W M + B*+ D -F.W is thuS
the sum of the monetarYbase andallmarketable net claimsowned by—
domesticresidents: it doesnot encompass eitherthe capitalizedvalue
of future tax
liabilities to the government
or that of thecentral bank's
future f0eigfl_eXChange
earningS. We postpone
until section 3 themodif i-
cationS necessary whenindividuals discounttheir future domestic-CUency
liabilities to the government.
Section 4 shows howthe model must be
changed when residentsalso capitalize the
stream of foreign_currencypay-
ments associatedwith the central bank'sreserves.
-
Whencondition (3) holds, conditions
(1) and (2) are redundant,
f or
any portfolio
ialance can be eliminatedthrough trades with thecentral
bank, and so, requires no change
in the home interest rate or
price level. We may solve(3) to obtain the nominaldomestic interest
rate p(P,W,D) that clearsthe asset markets; substitUtingthi,s formula
for r in (5), we express r as a
function of P and W:
=(P,W;D).
Imposition of the perfect_foresight
assumption that P/P =yieldsthe first
differential equation of the system,
p/P =¶(P,W;D),
(10)
which describes themotion of the pricelevel.7 The second differefltil
The precise form of (10)depends on the extent towhich the central bank
intervenes in the foreignexchange market withnon_interest bearing reserVes.
But the qualitative natureof the economy's dynamic
behavior is indePendertof
rii1chosen by the centralbank.7
equation, describing the evolution of domesticwealth, is derived by
substituting (10) for ir and p(P,W,D) for r in (8) toobtain:
W/P =w(P,W;D).
(11)
Figure 1 depicts the dynamic systemdescribed by equations (10) and
(11). Under mild assumptions, one can show that >0,
Try
<0 < 0, and
> 0. Thus, the locus along which P/P =0aridthelocus along which W/P =
0both have positive slope. Figure 1 is drawn onthe assumption that the
P/P =0or internal balance schedule is steeperthan the W/P =0or exter-
nal balance schedule. This assumption guaranteesthat the system has the
saddlepoint property of a unique path
converging to (W,P), the long-runor
stationary equilibrium.
3. Future taxes and the government debt
Thesystem consisting of equations (10)and (11) is one in which the
real equilibrium of the economy is affected byopenmarket operations, for
these alter the parameter D.In this section we ask how the previousmodel
must be modified when the public debt Ddoes not represent net wealth be-
cause individuals anticipate theassociated stream of taxes that they or
their descendants must pay to the government.For simplicity, it is assumed
until section 4 that y =0,so that the central bank must intervenein the
foreign exchange market with reserves thatbear no interest.
When anticipated tax liabilities to the governmentare capitalized
at market value, total nominal wealth, whichinc1ues the value of non--
marketable assets and liabilities, can be expressed astangible wealth, W,
minus the value of the stock of governmentdebt in private portfolios; D.
Residents flOWallocatetheir net wealth W-D among the three assets,taking8
into consideration their domestic—currency indebtedness to the government.
Equation (3) describing bond-market equilibrium becomes
H(r,r*,Py/(W_D),D/(W_D))(W_D) + F(r) = (12)
which differs from (3) in that the share of total wealth allocated to
holdings of marketable domestic bonds depends on the ratio of capitalized
future tax liabilities to total wealth.
When government bonds are not net wealth, the experiment of a
"helicopter drop" of government bonds to the public can have no effect
on the price level or the domestic bond rate, r, for total wealth,W —
andthe public's net position in domestic currency areunaffected.8 From
(12), this implies that H must have the form
f(r,r*,Py/(W_D)) + D/(W-D).
ui(r,r*,Py/(W_D)) (W-D) can be interpreted as the domestic public's desired
net claims denominated in domestic currency vis—-vis both foreigners and
the domestic government.
Using the definition of f,thecondition that the domestic bond
market clear is just
fi(r,r*,Py/(W_D)) (W—D) + F(r) =0, (13)
and it is evident that the unique interest rate r satisfying (13) can be
written in the form p(P,W-D) .Notingthat domestic demand for foreig:
8
This is the experiment considered by Barro (1974)9
bonds (equation (2)) is now written as B(r,r*,Py/(W_D))(W_D),9 we may
proceed as before to derive differential equations in P and W, this
time of the form
P/P =rr(P,W-D), (14)
W/P =w(P,W-D). (15)
The dynamic system can again be portrayed by figure 1. The importantdif-
ference now is that the system's endogenous variables are r, P, and W-D
rather than r, P, and W. This means that in the long run, any change in D
must be offset exactly by an equal change in W, with the nominal interest
rate and domestic price level returning to their original levels.
The adjustment process following an open—market purchase of domestic
government debt is depicted in figure 2. The monetary expansion leaves
tangible wealth W intact, for the decline, D, in bonds held by the public
is financed by an equivalent issue of central—bank money. However, the
government's discounted future revenue requirements also decline by D,
and thus total wealth——tangible plus intangible--increases. Looking at
(14) and (15), we see that the change in D shifts both schedules horizontally
by the amount LD, as shown in figure 2. Thus, the open—market purchase
has no long—run effect on total domestic wealth (inclusive of capital-
ized future taxes), the price level, or the interest rate. A long-run
decline in tangible wealth just offsets the fall in the public's anticipated,
discounted tax liabilities.
This eventual decline in tangible wealth is a consequence of the
current—account deficit oäcasioned by the open-market purchase. In fig. 2,
This also follows from the "helicopter" experiment. When government bonds
are not net wealth, an increase in D has no effect on the public's demand
for foreign bonds, for it involves no change in total wealth or portfolio
composition.10
the economy, on impact1 jumps verticallyto the stable arm of th system
associated with the lower level of D. The nominal and real interestrates
fall, inducing an increase in spending, a rise in the home price level,and
a current-account deficit. The fall in the bond rate andrise in the price
level are necessary because the increase in total wealth associatedwith
the cut in future taxes would otherwise result in excess demand fordomestic
debt. An outflow of capital--and so, a fall in central-bank reserves-—
accompanies the monetary expansion, but does not offset it completelyin the
short run. It is important to note that because reserves earn no interest,
the transfer of foreign assets from the central bank to the publicentails
a net increase in the stream of foreign—currencyinterest earnings reach-
ing domestic residents.
Over time, however, the initial capital outflow is reversed,and the
domestic-goods price, the interest rate, and total wealth return totheir
original levels. Since the money stock must do the same, the long-runoffset
to monetary policy is complete, and provides the mechanism throughwhich the
required fall in tangible wealth is accommodated. Theinitial increase in
the central bank's domestic assets is eventually matched by adecline in its
foreign assets. Part of this decline occurs at the momentthe central bank
intervenes to support the currency when the interest rate first falls.The
balance of the reserve loss occurs during the adjustment to long—runequi-
librium, for the capital inflow accompanying the current-accountdefict is
not sufficient to finance it.
To summarize, when government bonds are not net wealthand the central
bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market with non-interest-bearing
assets, expansionary monetary policy has a short-runeffect on the economy.
This short—run effect involves a current deficit that returnsthe economy to
a stationary position characterized by anunaltered interest rate and price
level but a lower level of tangible wealth. The decline in tangible wealth11
jus,t equals the decline in discounted future taxliabilities.Private holdings
of money and foreign assets are unchanged in the long run.
4. The role of interest—bearing reserve assets
The previous section's finding that open-market policy can affect the
short—run equilibrium of the economy when government bonds are not net wealth
depends on the assumption that the monetary authority's intervention medium
earns no interest. We now argue that when the central bank intervenes with
foreign bonds earning interest at the market rate r*, this short-run effect
of monetary policy disappears if the public capitalizes the stream of central-
bank foreign—exchange earnings at market value.
To show this, we write total wealth, inclusive of the discounted
value of future tax payments to the government and payments in foreign
currency from the central bank, as W -D+yR,where yR, again, is the
stock of interest—bearing foreign exchange reserves. yR of course equals
the present value of the stream of central-bank interest payments, dis-
counted at rate r*. As before, we assume that residents allocate their
total wealth W -D+yRamong the three available assets, taking into account
the capitalized value of anticipated central-bank foreign-exchange payments,
which are regarded as perfectly substitutable for interest earnings on
privately-held foreign bonds.
10
With this modification, equation (2) takes the form
B(r,r*,Py/(W_D+IR) ,yR/(W-D+yR)) (W—D+yR) =B*. (16)
A conceptual experiment similar to the one performed in the previous
section allows us to derive the form of B(....). Suppose that the central
13See note 9 for the justification.12
bank confiscates a portion of the stock ofprivately-owned foreign
bonds, adding these to its owninterest-bearing reserves and continuing
to distribute all earnings to the public.If the public capitalizes the
monetary authority's foreign exchangedisbursements, the confiscation
leaves both total (capitalized) wealth andthe net foreign asset position




As a consequence, (16) assumesthe form
B(r,r*,Py/(W_D+'(R)) (W—D+R) =B*+yR, (17)
showing that B(r,r*,PY/(W_DYR)) (W-D+yR)can be interpreted as the public's
total demand for claims on future paymentsdenominated in foreign currency.
Under the present assumptionS, (13) becomes
(r,r*,Py/(W_D+yR)) (W-D+yR) +F(r)=0, (18)
which yields the reduced-form interest rate r=p(P,W-D+YR).The conceptual
experiment of a central bank confiscationof foreign assets again shows that
noterm of form yR/(W -D+yR)can be an argument of H(...).
We can now consider the effect of an open-marketpurchase of domestic
debt when the central bank supports the exchangerate through operations
in interest-bearing reserves. Total
discounted wealth rises momentarily thanks113
tothe fall in future taxliabilitiesto the government. This leads to
an incipient excess demand for foreign exchange and domestic debt, and, by
(18), to downward pressure on the domestic bond rate. The excess demand
for foreign exchange can be accommodated with no change in the exchange
rate only through official intervention. As in section 3, the central
bank's interest—earning reserves decline and the money supply shrinks as
capital flows abroad.
However, the reserve loss is now matched by an equal fall in interest
payments from the central bank to the public and a corresponding decline in
total capitalized wealth. Because the increase in the public's foreign
bond holdings can be no greater than the reserve loss of the central bank,
the aggregate stream of foreign currency payments to the public cannot in-
crease. This is the crucial point for our analysis, for it implies that
residents can never succeed in extending their net foreign—exchange position
by trading newly—created money for central-bank reserves.
What happens? As (17) and (18) show, asset—market equilibrium will be
re—established only after the fall in interest-bearing reserves just equals
the fall in D, so that domestic wealth, inclusive of capitalized transfer
payments, is at its initial level. This leaves the domestic bond rate, and
so the national stock of foreign-currency bonds (B* +yR),unaltered. The
end result of the open-market purchase is a transfer of foreign bonds from
the monetary authority to the public that exactly offsets the initial in-
crease in the money supply. It must be emphasized that the central bank
is forced to buy back instantaneously all the money it has created in spite
of the fact that it has no formal obligation to peg the home interest rate.
We see that when the central bank intervenes with interest-bearing
foreign securities and all income streams are capitalized by the public,14
open_market policy has no
effect even in ths short run,for it leaves
total wealth and the perceivedportfolio compositionunchanged. Only
the composition of theasset side of the central
bank's balance sheet is
affected. An open—market purchase,
say, causes an equaltransfer of reserves
from the centra1-b1k portfolioto private portfoliosr
with no net increase
in the money supply. The
increase in the centralbank's domestic assets isthus
offset, fully and
instantaneously, by a fall inits foreign assets. The
reserve loss entails adecrease in totaldiscounted wealth as
perceived by the public, adecrease that just offsetsthe increase in
wealth due to the fall infuture tax liabilities tothe government. This
mechanism, which allows theasset markets to remainin equilibrium at the
initial interest rate and pricelevel, is absent when thecentral bank
pegs the exchangerate through transactions
in foreign assets that earnno
interest. For a fall in reserves,in that case, involvesno fall in
the stream of foreign currency
payments from the governmentto the public.
A transfer f foreignassets from the centralbank to the public enablesthe
latter to escape the taxthat the central bank imposesby holding official
reserves in an unproductiveform.
The analysis, SOfar,has assumed that the homecountry is small,
in the sense that shiftsin its behavioral relations
exert no influence
on the world interestrate or price level. The
assumption may be relaxed
with no change in this
section's conclusions regardingthe effects of open-
market policy. Even when acountry is large in theabove sense, open_market
monetary expansion leads
only to a transfer offoreign securities fromthe
central bank to the domesticpublic; and this leavesthe equilibrium of
home and foreign bondmarkets undisturbed. Theconclusion is at variance with
Mundell'S (1964) findingthat the central bankof a large country willalter
thelevelof economic activity athome and abroad throughits open-market policy.15
5. Conclusion
This paper has studied the conduct of open-market policy in aworld
in which individualsfullY capitalize or internalize all income streams.
We have found that even when assets denominated in differentcurrencies
are imperfect substitutes in portfolios, open-market monetarypolicy
has no long—run effect and possibly no short—run effect when thecentral
bank holds the exchange rate fixed. Under these circumstances, the
neutrality propositions of the portfolio-balance model ofinternational
asset markets are much stronger than those of the "capital-flowfunction"
model it has supplanted.
The results have implications for a world of managed floating as
well as for a world of rigidly fixed rates. An extension of our arguments
shows how sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange marketwill be
a self—defeating policy when intervention assets bearinterest. A steri-
lized purchase of foreign exchange, for example, entails a transferof
interest—earning foreign assets from the public to the central bank, a
rise in domestic holdings of government debt, and an equal increasein the
present value of future taxes-—an operation that leavesthe asset markets
unperturbed because all central—bank interest earnings arereturned to,
and capitalized by, the public. Only when the public fails to capitalize
the relevant income streams, or when the government taxes itscitizens by
holding the intervention medium in barren form, is it possibleto attain
independent exchange—rate and money—stock targets in the short runthrough
domestic debt management.16
References
Barro, R.J., 1974, Are government bonds netwealth? journal of Political
Economy, 82, 1095—1117.
Boyer, R.S., 1975, Commodity marketsand bond markets in a small, fixed-
exchange—rate economy, Canadian Journal ofEconomics, 8, 1—23.
Boyer, R.S., 1979, Sterilization andthe monetary approach to balance of
payments analysis, Journal of Monetary Economics,5, 295-300.
Branson, W.H., 1976, portfolio equilibriumand monetary policy with
foreign and non—traded assets, in: E.Claassen and P. Salin, eds.,
Recent issues in international economics(North-Holland, imsterdam).
Dornbusch, R., 1977, Capital mobility and
portfolio balance, in: R.Z.
Aliber, ed., The political economyof monetary reform (Macmillan,
London).
Frenkel, J.A., and C.A. Rodriguez, 1975,portfolio equilibrium and the
balance of payments: A monetary approach,American Economic Review,
65, 674—688.
Girton, L., and D.W. Henderson, 1976, Financial capitalmovements and
central bank behavior in a two country, short-run portfoliobalance
model, Journal of Monetary Economics, 2, 33-61.
Henderson, D.W., 1977, Modeling the interdependence ofnational money
and capital markets, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings,
67, 190—199.
Kouri, P.J.K., and M.G. Porter, 1974, International capitalflows and
portfolio equilibrium, Journal of Political Economy,82, 443-467.
Metzler, L.A., 1951, Wealth, saving and the rate of interest,Journal
of Political Economy, 59, 93—116.
Mundell, R.A., 1960, The public debt, corporate income taxesand the rate
of interest, Journal of Political Economy, 68, 622-626.
Mundell, R.A., 1963, Capital mobility and stabilization policyunder
fixed and flexible exchange rates, Canadian Journalof Economics
and Political Science, 29, 475—485.
Mundell, R.A., 1964, A reply: Capital mobilityand size, Canadian
Journal of Economics and Political Science, 30, 421-431.
Obstfeld, M., 1980, Imperfect asset substitutability and monetarypolicy
under fixed exchange rates, Journal of International EconomicS,10,
177—200.
Stockman, A.C., 1979, Monetary control and sterilizationunder pegged
exchange rates, unpublished paper, University ofRochester.Figure 2
P
P
.
P/PO/
W/PO
w
Figure 1
P
P
w
P/P
w/Po
—w
W+tD
I